The nomenclature of the Anthropocene for this geological epoch marks in a novel way the global impact of human activity on the world. Consequently, it creatively raises the alarm bell of global environmental devastation. However, the narrative implicit in the Anthropocene presents challenges to use it as a departure point for developing an ethics of responsibility, as it contains morally relevant but ambiguous etiologies, phenomenological challenges to discrete human agency, and the potential erasure of both causes and victims of global (...) environmental degradation. This challenge compounds the challenges to traditional models of responsibility‐as‐imputation by global forms of environmental degradation signaled in the Anthropocene. Our new epoch demands new models of responsibility. This article draws upon neglected work by Paul Ricoeur to reconstruct a twofold model of responsibility: (1) responsibility‐as‐imputation and (2) responsibility for the fragile other and the domains that amplify fragility. It shows that a twofold model can more completely respond to harms elicited by anthropogenic environmental degradation by maintaining the benefits of traditional models of responsibility‐as‐accountability while dramatically expanding the subject and objects of responsibility through attention to the fragile and thus better serving us as we navigate responsibility in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Love and Christian Ethics: Tradition, Theory, and Society eds. by Frederick V. Simmons and Brian C. SorrelsMichael Le ChevallierLove and Christian Ethics: Tradition, Theory, and Society Edited by Frederick V. Simmons and Brian C. Sorrels WASHINGTON, DC: GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. 400 pp. $119.00 / $39.95Fredrick Simmons and Brian Sorrels present an impressive, cohesive volume of essays by twenty-two leading scholars who engage different facets of love and (...) theological ethics. although dedicated to gene outka—thus setting the broad theme and establishing his work as a privileged point of reference throughout the volume—Love and Christian Ethics should not be confused with a Festschrift. it accomplishes far more in intellectual diversity and depth, making a significant contribution to scholarship.The volume is organized into three sections: tradition, theory, and society. across the first section, the authors address love within major sources and figures, treating scripture, greek philosophy, augustine, aquinas, Kant, and Kierkegaard. Far from a textbook presentation, each essay marks out its own argument regarding the place of love in the respective subject. The second section is devoted to major theoretical questions raised within scholarship on love and ethics, addressing topics like the relation of eudaimonism to love (a running thread that emerges in the book), forgiveness, friendship, and evolution. The final section moves into the field of practice, application, and society, including an essay critically engaging implicit presentations of love found in the law, another treating love and international development, and one poignant essay by Mark D. Jordan calling for a moratorium on strong pronouncements in sexual ethics until ethicists can cultivate a loving knowledge of sex. This final section also includes reflections on love in the Jewish and Muslim traditions. Simmons's introduction and William Werpehowksi's afterword provide useful bookends. although no single thesis blandly governs this volume as a whole—incorporating complementary, divergent, and competing positions—in constructing this volume, Simmons and Sorrels argue that love is not eclipsed in Christian ethics but has a rich and variegated tradition. Werpehowski appraises [End Page 210] the volume as a whole, identifying key threads that emerge, like relations of love to eudaimonism and the theme of neighbor love.The volume is admirable in its breadth and depth. It offers a robust encounter with major figures and questions, providing historical recovery as well as critical and constructive engagement. That said, depth can work against breadth, with essays like Oliver O'Donovan's demanding a familiarity with Augustine Confessions that will send the reader back to his or her bookcases. Missing too are other notable figures and topics, such as the Protestant Reformers, Christian mystics, and feminist ethicists. Nevertheless, these gaps do not diminish the volume as a whole. I found myself again and again excited by the insights offered by the contributors, unsettling easy assumptions regarding the relation between eudaimonia and love, illustrating the depths of accounts of friendship for thinking about polity and mediating institutions, and cautioning against overconfidence in sexual ethics as its boundaries destabilize.Love and Christian Ethics would benefit scholars, teachers, and students alike. Its broad engagement with contemporary scholarship on love makes it a useful starting point for any researcher dipping or diving into this field. Introducing professors to key and sometimes obscured questions within figures and topics, it can round out lectures and help introduce students to the growing edge of scholarship on love. It would serve as a useful reference for any upper division or graduate course engaging with this significant, but often ignored, theme in Christian ethics.Rare is it to find a book that embodies the very theme it presents. These essays on love are a scholarly gift of the best sort—one not diminished but enhanced in its sharing.Michael Le ChevallierUniversity of ChicagoCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Philosophie et traduction sont dans un rapport d’élaboration réciproque. D’une part, en effet, la philosophie est usage du logos, ce qui signifie qu’elle est non seulement raison, mais aussi langage qui s’exprime dans une langue. Dans la mesure où la philosophie est un lieu de transmission et d’échange, c’est-à-dire dans la mesure où elle passe d’une époque à l’autre et d’une culture à l’autre, elle a donc besoin d’être traduite et retraduite d’une langue à l’autre. D’autre part, et réciproquement, la (...) philosophie est toujours plus ou moins présente dans la théorie et dans la pratique de la traduction, soit de manière implicite ou impensée, soit de manière explicite ou théorisée. Or ce rapport d’élaboration réciproque de la philosophie et de la traduction signifie qu’il n’est pas possible de dissocier philosophie de la traduction et traduction de la philosophie. La philosophie ne peut légitimement parler de la traduction qu’en se posant, réflexivement, la question de sa propre traduction. Enfin, pour pousser l’enquête sur cette élaboration réciproque de la philosophie et de la traduction jusqu’à son point le plus radical, on doit interroger la possibilité même de la philosophie au moyen du concept d’impensable, et la possibilité même de la traduction par le concept d’intraduisible. De ce point de vue, l’écart irréductible entre les différentes langues d’une part, l’abîme insondable entre l’être et la pensée humaine d’autre part, deviennent modèle l’un pour l’autre. Ainsi, si la philosophie ne peut par définition penser l’impensable, du moins peut-elle le traduire ; tandis que si la traduction ne peut par principe traduire l’intraduisible, elle peut quand même le donner à penser. (shrink)

Contrairement à ce que l'on croit souvent, l'interprète ne se contente pas de traduire, mécaniquement, le contenu : il l'adapte aux spécificités de son auditoire. La lingua franca qu'est devenue l'anglais pose d'ailleurs des problèmes spécifiques, du fait de la diversité de ses variantes, que ce soit celles d'anglophones ou de non-anglophones, d'où le recours à une forme d'anglais « international» pour les besoins de la communication. Par ailleurs, l'anglais et le français sont les langues officielles d'un organisme comme l'OCDE, (...) mais bien d'autres langues peuvent être utilisées dans des occasions particulières . Cette tendance au plurilinguisme semble de plus en plus s'étendre aux organismes internationaux en raison, notamment, des demandes des nouveaux pays membres.Contrary to what is often believed, the interpreter does not simply translate mechanically content: it adapts to the specific audience. What has become the lingua franca English also poses special problems because of the diversity of its variants, whether those of English Or non-English speakers to where the use of a form of "international" English for communication purposes. In addition, English and French are the official languages ​​of the OECD as an organization, but other languages ​​may be used in special occasions .. This trend seems to multilingualism increasingly extend to international bodies, particularly because of the demands of the new member countries. (shrink)

Natural selection is commonly seen not just as an explanation for adaptive evolution, but as the inevitable consequence of “heritable variation in fitness among individuals”. Although it remains embedded in biological concepts, such a formalisation makes it tempting to explore whether this precondition may be met not only in life as we know it, but also in other physical systems. This would imply that these systems are subject to natural selection and may perhaps be investigated in a biological framework, where (...) properties are typically examined in light of their putative functions. Here we relate the major questions that were debated during a three-day workshop devoted to discussing whether natural selection may take place in non-living physical systems. We start this report with a brief overview of research fields dealing with “life-like” or “proto-biotic” systems, where mimicking evolution by natural selection in test tubes stands as a major objective. We contend the challenge may be as much conceptual as technical. Taking the problem from a physical angle, we then discuss the framework of dissipative structures. Although life is viewed in this context as a particular case within a larger ensemble of physical phenomena, this approach does not provide general principles from which natural selection can be derived. Turning back to evolutionary biology, we ask to what extent the most general formulations of the necessary conditions or signatures of natural selection may be applicable beyond biology. In our view, such a cross-disciplinary jump is impeded by reliance on individuality as a central yet implicit and loosely defined concept. Overall, these discussions thus lead us to conjecture that understanding, in physico-chemical terms, how individuality emerges and how it can be recognised, will be essential in the search for instances of evolution by natural selection outside of living systems. (shrink)

Dans un fragment de son commentaire perdu sur les Catégories d’Aristote, adressé à Gédalios et transmis par Simplicius dans son propre Commentaire surles Catégories, Porphyre évoque la distinction, à première vue énigmatique, entre les termes techniques grecs huparxis et hupostasis. On avance dans laprésente contribution que des passages tirés d’une source inattendue – le De Incarnatione du moine Théodore de Raithu – peuvent illuminerle sens de ce texte porphyrien. Ce résultat fournit l’occasion de quelques réflexions sur l’influence de Porphyre sur (...) la pensée patristique. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes est le seul penseur de la tradition philosophique a qui le philosophe britannique Michael Oakeshott consacra entierement l'un de ses livres, un recueil d'essais et de conferences qu'il publia en 1975 sous le titre de Hobbes on Civil Association. A quoi tient l'importance decisive reconnue ainsi a l'oeuvre de Hobbes, et quel role particulier joua la pensee de Hobbes dans l'elaboration de la pensee de Oakeshott lui-meme? Le titre donne au recueil donne une indication precieuse. Tant (...) d'un point de vue philosophique que d'un point de vue historique, Oakeshott a en effet thematise a travers le concept d' association civile un mode d'association politique precis des hommes, celui dans lequel les individus sont lies par le respect de certaines regles et de certaines pratiques, mais non par une fin commune unique. C'est dans cette perspective que Oakeshott a pu opposer la nomocratie d'une societas a la teleocratie d'une universitas, c'est-a-dire d'un Etat qui se donnerait comme mission d'imposer un meme objectif a tous ses membres. La lecture que fait Oakeshott de Hobbes est ainsi tres clairement une lecture liberale: il comprend Hobbes comme un penseur du cadre formel d'une societas, et non pas d'une universitas, c'est-a-dire comme un penseur, precisement, de l' association civile. Afin de permettre l'evaluation d'une telle lecture, la traduction de l'ouvrage de Oakeshott, la premiere en langue francaise, est accompagnee de la traduction de cinq autres essais que l'auteur a consacres a Hobbes entre 1935 et 1974. (shrink)

Cet article présente la première édition critique du commentaire sur le De longitudine et brevitate vitae Aristotelis de Pierre d’Auvergne, ainsi qu’une édition de la traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Le texte est particulièrement intéressant, parce qu’il fait partie, semble-t-il, du projet de Pierre d’Auvergne de compléter les commentaires sur les Parva naturalia de Thomas d’Aquin. L’introduction étudie aussi le concept philosophique de ‘vie’ chez Aristote.

While many theories exist to explain the complexity of environmental behaviour, the role of individuals' relationship with nature has not yet been fully clarified. This paper attempts to operationalise human-nature relationships. It expands upon a scale assessed by an iterative process of mixed methods in the US and Europe. This scale is then used to assess individuals' relationship with nature, and whether such relationships correlate with environmental behaviour. The value scale of Schwartz's Theory of Basic Values is used to validate (...) the results. The results verify that people hold multiple human-nature relationships, confirm strong correlations between human-nature relationships and values, and reveal that individuals' behaviour is connected to the relationship they have with nature. (shrink)

This book examines the negative power that child maltreatment has on individuals and society ethically and politically, while analyzing the positive power that parental love and healthy families have. To address how best to confront the problem of child maltreatment, it examines several policy options, ultimately defending a policy of licensing parents, while carefully examining the tension between child and adult rights and duties.

Trying, in his Soliloquia, to prove the immortality of the soul from the imperishability of truth, Augustine apparently commits a fallacia aequivocationis. Truth is imperishable insofar as it subsists independently. Immortality follows from this only insofar as truth is constituted by mental acts and is thus inseparable from the soul; for dualistically inspired scepticism, truth is given as being immanent to consciousness through methodologically correct procedures establishing coherence. This fallacy is avoidable only by presupposing a Platonic two-world-dualism: The soul, as (...) well as truth, belongs to the subsisting intelligible and therefore essentially has knowledge. Ignorance can be understood, according to recollection theory, as partial forgetting allowing for distinguishing between true and false, and remarkably also between true ideas and deceiving sensory imaginations. Such a faculty encompassing the intelligible as well as the sensible, however, undermines dualism. (shrink)

Die rationalen Vermögen sind bewusst im Hinblick auf den Begriff des zu bewirkenden Zustands oder Gegenstands erworben. Dank dieses Logos oder Wissens um die Definition des zu bewirkenden Ziels können sie nicht bloß wie die angeborenen naturalen Vermögen angewandt werden oder nicht, sondern sind für inhaltlich gegensätzliche Resultate offen. Bei den rationalen Vermögen im engeren Sinne, den Kunstfertigkeiten, erwerben wir durch Einübung wertneutrale operative Fähigkeiten, so dass erst eine hinzukommende Entscheidung eine eindeutige Verwirklichung erlaubt. Bei den Tugenden üben wir uns (...) in ein Vermögen ein, dem eine sittliche Ausrichtung der Entscheidungen integriert ist, das dennoch prinzipiell offen bleibt. Um in einer Situation die Handlung herauszufinden, die äußerlich die Merkmale einer Tugend hat, muss die Naturanlage zum rationalen Vermögen entfaltet sein. Dieses ist in der Tugend zur Disposition weiterentwickelt, sich für diese Handlungsweise stets und um ihrer selbst willen zu entscheiden.Unlike innate natural potencies, acquired rational potencies by virtue of the logos of the goal to be realised not only can be exercised or not, but even are open to results of opposite contents. In the case of rational potencies in the narrower sense , we acquire, by habituation, operational abilities which are morally neutral so that a decision is required for an unequivocal result to be achieved. In the case of virtues, the acquired potency has a moral orientation for our decisions integrated in itself and nevertheless remains, in principle, open. In order to find out in a certain situation which action has the external characteristics of a virtue, the natural faculty must be developed to be a rational potency. In the virtue, the latter is further developed to be the disposition to choose this type of action always and for its own sake. - This new systematic reconstruction is meant to explore in how far Aristotelian virtues may be regarded as rational potencies. (shrink)

Kripkes These soll widersprochen werden, die modalen Begriffe,notwendig' bzw.,kontingent' (Metaphysik) seien auch extensional von den epistemischen,a priori' bzw.,a posteriori' (Erkenntnistheorie) verschieden. Nur auf Aussagengehalte als ihr Subjekt bezogen, werden beide Begriffspaare vergleichbar. Geht es aber nicht um die notwendigen (wesentlichen) oder kontingenten Eigenschaften einer Sache (die essentialistische modalitas de re, z.B. die Identität einesIndividuums mit sich), sondem um die notwendige oder kontingente Geltung eines Aussagegehaltes (modalitas de dicto), dann ist bedeutsam, wie eine Aussage über einen solchen Sachverhalt begründbar und erkennbar (...) ist. So ist auch die Referenz nie ohne Kenntnis eines Allgemeinbegriffs möglich. (shrink)

Kripkes These soll widersprochen werden, die modalen Begriffe,notwendig' bzw.,kontingent' (Metaphysik) seien auch extensional von den epistemischen,a priori' bzw.,a posteriori' (Erkenntnistheorie) verschieden. Nur auf Aussagengehalte als ihr Subjekt bezogen, werden beide Begriffspaare vergleichbar. Geht es aber nicht um die notwendigen (wesentlichen) oder kontingenten Eigenschaften einer Sache (die essentialistische modalitas de re, z.B. die Identität einesIndividuums mit sich), sondem um die notwendige oder kontingente Geltung eines Aussagegehaltes (modalitas de dicto), dann ist bedeutsam, wie eine Aussage über einen solchen Sachverhalt begründbar und erkennbar (...) ist. So ist auch die Referenz nie ohne Kenntnis eines Allgemeinbegriffs möglich. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason every event is determined down to the smallest detail. This principle entails a global determinism which is connected with the claim of uniformity: All things are basically one and differ only by degrees. Accordingly, Leibniz tries to explain the traditional distinction of necessity and contingency by the difference between a definite demonstration and an open, never ending analysis, that is a quantitative difference between the finite and infinite. It is controversial whether contingency can (...) be saved by this conception in the face of the thesis: Every predicate which can be truly attributed to a subject is included in the complete notion of this individual substance. The difficulties of the Lucky Proof can only be avoided by supposing: The infinity of analysis cannot be based on the fact that the complete notion is a simple conjunction of innumerable predicates which are not conceptually connected to each other. Then every predicate could be deduced from it in a finite number of steps; therefore, it would have been demonstrated and would consequently be necessary. The infinity of analysis cannot be either based on the fact that it is infinitely complex to prove that the subject is not contradictory. Conceptions like this or a superessentialism are not adequate, because they fail to distinguish between necessary and contingent statements about an individual within a single possible world. The complete notion and, therefore, the analysis of a contingent truth comprises an infinitely complex content, because the predicates of an individual are connected by infinitely complex relations. This corresponds to the idea that the perceptions of an individual mirror the infinitely complex connections by which the world is determined. (shrink)

Dasselbe Tun qua physische Wirksamkeit kann unter einer Beschreibung absichtlich, unter einer anderen dagegen unbeabsichtigt sein. Wer dies von einer Handlung behauptet, macht sie zu etwas bloß Naturalem, weil das Mentale, die Absicht, so eine rein gedankliche Bestimmung und kein reales Moment der Handlung ist. Eine antinaturalistische, aber nicht dualistische Position ist möglich, wenn man hylemorphistisch die Absicht als Form auffaßt, die eine Körperbewegung zu einer bestimmten Handlung als einer zugleich physischen und mentalen Wirklichkeit macht. Dies erlaubt nicht-willkürlich abzugrenzen: Eine (...) meist kontingente naturkausale Wirkung meines unmittelbaren Tuns ist, sofern sie beabsichtigt war, ein integrierender Bestandteil der Handlung, ja definiert als Ergebnis und Ziel sogar ihre Art, während unbeabsichtigte Momente als Handlungsfolgen außerhalb ihrer liegen. (shrink)

Da mittelalterliche Denker Gottes Wissen der Welt vorwiegend als ein praktisches, auf Fürsorge gründendes Wissen begriffen, können die freien künftigen menschlichen Taten nicht als prinzipiell unwißbar ausgeschlossen werden. Gottes praktisches Wissen des kontingenten Zukünftigen gründet für Duns Scotus auf seinem faktisch unwandelbaren Willensentschluß und ist daher nur insofern kontingent, als es kontrafaktisch anders hätte sein können. Ockham verwirft solche irrealen Alternativen gleichzeitig zum Faktischen, da die Eigenart willentlicher Verursachung auch ohne solche hohen "ontologischen Kosten" erklärbar sei: Anders als eine Naturursache (...) könne die freie Ursache ohne gewandelte Bedingungen im nächsten Augenblick anderes wirken. Innerhalb allein der wirklichen Welt ergeben echte Gegenwartsaussagen angesichts der Irreversibilität des Geschehenen hinfort notwendige Vergangenheitsaussagen. Aussagen über göttliches Vorauswissen seien hingegen nur oberflächengrammatisch Gegenwartsaussagen, sachlich jedoch kontingent, da ihre Geltung von einem kontingenten Zukünftigen abhänge, wenngleich unwandelbar, weil jede Zukunftsaussage, falls wahr, unveränderlich wahr sei . Bei Unwandelbarkeit aber läßt sich Kontingenz kaum anders als mit der Skotischen Konzeption gleichzeitiger irrealer Möglichkeiten erklären: Gott hätte das faktisch stets Gewußte niemals zu wissen brauchen. (shrink)

_Challenges standard views of the origins of the _Daodejing_, revealing the work’s roots in a tradition of physical cultivation._.

The Laozi (Daodejing) and the Zhuangzi have long been familiar to Western readers and have served as basic sources of knowledge about early Chinese Daoism. Modern translations and studies of these works have encouraged a perception of Daoism as a mystical philosophy heavy with political implications that advises kings to become one with the Dao. Breaking with this standard approach, The Pristine Dao argues that the Laozi and the Zhuangzi participated in a much wider tradition of metaphysical discourse that included (...) a larger corpus of early Chinese writings. This book demonstrates that early Daoist discourse possessed a distinct, textually constituted coherence and a religious sensibility that starkly differed from the intellectual background of all other traditions of early China, including Confucianism. The author argues that this discourse is best analyzed through its emergence from the mythological imagination of early China, and that it was unified by a set of notions about the Dao that was shared by all of its participants. The author introduces certain categories from the Western religious and philosophical traditions in order to bring out the distinctive qualities constituting this discourse and to encourage its comparison with other religious and philosophical traditions. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. The article is based on original translations of passages from Vyāsatīrtha’s Nyāyāmr̥ta and Tarkatāṇḍava. Philosophically, the article focuses on the issue of empty-terms/nonexistent entities, particularly in the context of the theory of inference. I begin by outlining the origin of the Mādhva and Nyāya positions about these issues in their respective analyses of perceptual illusion. I then contrast the role of (...) Gaṅgeśa’s thought in the Nyāyāmr̥ta and Tarkatāṇḍava and show how Vyāsatīrtha responds to Gaṅgeśa’s ideas in different ways in those texts. I conclude with a discussion of how Vyāsatīrtha defends the Mādhva theory of “substrate-free” qualities against Gaṅgeśa in order to show that we can think and make valid inferences about nonexistent things. (shrink)